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Abstract
This Article looks at the legal structure of the agreements signed between the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization (“PLO”) and Israel from 1993 to 1995 (the “Agreements”). They consist of
the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993 (“DOP”), the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho Area signed in 1994 (“Gaza-Jericho Agreement”), the Protocol on Economic Relations
signed in 1994 (“Paris Protocol”), and the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip
signed in 1995 (“Interim Agreement”). The Article examines the impact of the Agreements on the
Palestinian economy and the development of a viable private sector. The Article also addresses the
political factors affecting the implementation of the Agreements. The Article illustrates how the
nature of the signed Agreements, premised on functional and quasi-territorial jurisdiction without
any territorial integrity between the PA areas, as allocated under the Interim Agreement, limited
Palestinian ability to engage in effective economic planning and institutional development. This
Article concludes with a look at the recently introduced Palestinian Reforms, which, in light of the
deteriorated state of affairs and mutual distrust between the Palestinians and the Israelis since the
stalled Camp David negotiations in July 2000, have become the newest dimension of the Pales-
tinian struggle towards Statehood. The Palestinian Reform program, along with the speech of the
President of the United States, George W. Bush, Jr., who, on June 24, 2002 articulated the U.S.
vision for the establishment of a Palestinian State in 2005, have injected the ailing peace process
with much-needed optimism.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article looks at the legal structure of the agreements
signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO")
and Israel from 1993 to 1995 (the "Agreements"). They consist
of the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993 ("DOP"),' the
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area signed in
1994 ("Gaza-Jericho Agreement"),2 the Protocol on Economic
Relations signed in 1994 ("Paris Protocol"), 3 and the Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip signed in 1995
("Interim Agreement"). 4 The Article examines the impact of
the Agreements on the Palestinian economy and the develop-
ment of a viable private sector. The Article also addresses the
political factors affecting the implementation of the Agree-
ments.
The Agreements launched the historical peace process be-
tween Palestinians and Israelis and set in motion a series of pri-
vate and public investments. In this respect, the Article exam-
ines the framework and the scope of the Agreements as to the
territorial, functional, and personal jurisdiction of the Palestin-
ian Authority ("PA").. It looks at the powers and the authorities
* Hiba I. Husseini is the founder and Managing Partner of Husseini & Dajani, a
law firm in Ramallah, West Bank. Ms. Husseini has served as legal advisor and member
of the Palestinian Negotiations Team since 1994. She has been involved in a number of
discussions on Palestinian-Israeli economic relations. Ms. Husseini serves on the boards
of various local non-profit and professional associations and is the Vice Chairman of the
Palestine Securities Exchange since 1996. She has numerous publications. Ms. Hus-
seini received herJ.D. from Georgetown University in 1992.
1. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, PLO-Isr. [hereinafter DOP].
2. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and theJericho Area, May 4, 1994, PLO-Isr. [here-
inafier Gaza-Jericho Agreement].
3. Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel and the
PLO, Apr. 29, 1994, PLO-Isr. [hereinafter Paris Protocol].
4. The Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
Sept. 28, 1995, PLO-Isr. [hereinafter Interim Agreement]. The Interim Agreement was
witnessed by the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Arab Republic
of Egypt, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Euro-
pean Union ("EU").
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transferred by Israel, and the structure of the Paris Protocol in
terms of its effect on the shaping of the present Palestinian-Is-
raeli relationship and its impact on the Palestinian economy.
The Article illustrates how the nature of the signed Agree-
ments, premised on functional and quasi-territorial jurisdiction
without any territorial integrity between the PA areas, as allo-
cated under the Interim Agreement, limited Palestinian ability
to engage in effective economic planning and institutional devel-
opment. By operation of the Agreements, Israel unilaterally
benefited from the peace process and particularly, the end of
the long Arab boycott.5 While the greatest downturn of the Pal-
estinian economy came on the heels of the events of September
28, 2000, the PA economy had been experiencing major set-
backs and deterioration from 1994 to 1999. A process of "de-
development" persisted.6 The average Palestinian did not expe-
rience the much-anticipated peace dividends. The periods from
1996 to 1998, 7 and the fourth quarter of 2000 to the present,
witnessed a policy of tight closures' in the areas of Gaza and the
West Bank, and within the West Bank. During the first period,
5. Since the War of 1948 and the subsequent Declaration of the State of Israel in
1948, no Arab country has recognized Israel. On September 17, 1978, Egypt signed the
Camp David Accords with Israel. See Camp David Accords, Sept. 17, 1978, Isr.-Egypt.
Only the launch of peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis resulted in some
form of new rapprochement between Arab States and Israel. In 1994, Jordan signed a
Peace Treaty with Israel. See Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the
Hashemite Kingdom ofJordan, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan. Qatar and Morocco normal-
ized relations and established representative offices in Israel. Syria and Lebanon en-
tered negotiations with Israel, but no agreement has been reached. Israel has deemed
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process a process that has brought the country out of isola-
tion in the Middle East, a step of major significant regional and international impact,
especially because the peace with Egypt had remained a cold peace.
6. Sara Roy, De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society since Oslo, 28(3)
J. OF PALESTINE STUD. 64 (1999).
7. The policies of the Israeli Prime Minister of the Likud Party, Binjamin Netany-
ahu, resulted in digging a tunnel under the al-Aqsa Mosque. Palestinians protested and
the Neanyahu government imposed the 1996-1998 closures.
8. Israel instituted a policy of physically closing the Palestinian territories and im-
posing curfews as a security measure. The articulated Israeli government position on
closures is that closures deter Palestinian violence and fight terror. It is not the aim of
this Article to discuss closures; however, it is important to point out that the closure
policy was first initiated in 1991 - well before the peace process and the Palestinian
acts of violence. The first Palestinian suicide bombing occurred in 1993. See Amira
Hass, Israel's Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression, 31 (3) J. OF
PALESTINE STUD. 5, 13 (2002). At the same time, the closure policy institutionalized by
Israel has been the most detrimental element in the downturn of the Palestinian econ-
omy. A combination of closures and curfews was imposed on the city of Nablus, in the
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movement was authorized for certain categories (VIPs and busi-
nesses) and by permit only. The closure policies obstructed the
Palestinian economy and resulted in the first set of disappoint-
ments for the private sector and investors. The second period
witnessed an expansion of the imposed closure policies and cur-
fews. Villages, towns, cities, and refugee camps became totally
cut off. Palestinians were denied access to, from, and within
their own areas, ' while prolonged curfews were imposed in ma-
jor cities like Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, and Bethlehem, result-
ing in paralysis and a collapse of the economy."' The potential
socio-economic development did not occur, which further deep-
ened grassroots disillusionment.
The peace equation for the Palestinians has meant two
things: an end to thirty-five years of occupation," and economic
sustainable growth. Thus, peace was as much about achieving
development and prosperity, as it was about realizing the Pales-
tinian aspiration for Statehood and independence.
The political dimensions, as they evolved within the respec-
tive Palestinian and Israeli internal political equation, marginal-
ized the development of a viable business environment. Israeli
and Palestinian derogations from the terms of the Interim
Agreement and the Paris Protocol were a major factor. At the
same time, certain Israeli and Palestinian politicians became in-
volved in major businesses and created alliances. 2 Conse-
quently, the business community became increasingly dis-
enchanted as it realized that the peace dividends would not ma-
terialize.
Notwithstanding the derogations from the Interim Agree-
north of the West Bank, for two and a half months. During that period, the Palestine
Securities Exchange, located in Nablus, was forced to suspend trading.
9. Today, there are eighty-four military road blocks and thirty-eight permanent
check points in the West Bank. The Gaza Strip has eleven permanent check points and
twelve military road blocks.
10. Today, humanitarian aid from the international community keeps over 60% of
Palestinians from starvation. Palestinians are earning less than US$2.00 per day, the
World Bank figure for those living under the poverty line. Humanitarian Crisis in the
West Bank/Gaza Strip, PALESTINIAN MONITOR, July 29, 2002, at 1.
11. The first step in implementing the Palestinian legitimate rights is enunciated
in the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (Concerning Principles for a Just and
l.asting Peace in the Middle East), U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (1967).
12. MA'ARIV SHABAT (FBIS/WNC, Dec. 6, 2002) (author's trans.) (on file with au-
thor). According to MA'ARIV, Palestinians and Israelis paid and received commissions
and kickbacks. These transactions were not transparent.
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ment and the Paris Protocol, the letter of the Agreements
proved dysfunctional in the areas of economic growth and devel-
opment. The arrangements, as articulated in the Agreements,
engulfed the Palestinian economy in its Israeli larger, richer, and
more advanced counterpart. This was the effect of the customs
envelope created by the Paris Protocol. Although trade volume
was large between the two sides, it was strictly one-way: from
Israel to the PA. Palestinians remained dependent on Israel for
raw materials, imports, exports, standards, tariff structure, and
customs duties. The mechanism for having Israel collect taxes
on behalf of the Palestinian treasury became largely ineffective,
as it became an instrument of Israeli political pressure. The
same applied to the issue of Palestinian labor working in Israel.
Labor was denied movement in the PA areas and access to Israel.
Thus, selective implementation of the Agreements, coupled with
tight closure policies, resulted in a severe decline of the econ-
omy. 13
This Article concludes with a look at the recently intro-
duced Palestinian Reforms, which, in light of the deteriorated
state of affairs and mutual distrust between the Palestinians and
the Israelis since the stalled Camp David negotiations in July
2000, have become the newest dimension of the Palestinian
struggle towards Statehood. 4 The Palestinian Reform program,
along with the speech of the President of the United States,
George W. Bush, Jr., who, on June 24, 2002 articulated the U.S.
vision for the establishment of a Palestinian State in 2005,"5 have
injected the ailing peace process with much-needed optimism.
I. ESTABLISHMENT AND POWERS OF THE
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
A. Peace Agreements
The PA was established in conjunction with the historic
13. See generally DEssus, S. J. ET AL., LONG-TERM POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE PALESTIN-
IAN ECONOMY (2002) (on file with author). See also infra part L.
14. The PLO declared Statehood in November 1988, and the PA reiterated the
declaration in 1998. Today, 134 countries worldwide have recognized Palestine .as a
State. The major countries of the Western world have not, but are moving toward that
recognition, as articulated by President George Bush, Jr. on June 24, 2002. See Presi-
dent George W. Bush, Address at the White House Rose Garden on Calls for New Pales-
tinian Leadership (June 24, 2002).
15. Id.
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DOP between the PLO 16 and the Government of Israel, on Sep-
tember 19, 1993.17 The DOP states:
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the cur-
rent Middle East peace process is... to establish a Palestinian
Interim Self-Government Authority . . .for the Palestinian
people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip leading to perma-
nent settlement for a transitional period not exceeding five
18
years ... .
Accordingly, the DOP calls for a two-staged agreement for the
political process: an interim period of five years, followed by a
permanent status settlement based on Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 338.19 To this effect, Article V(4) of the DOP rec-
ognizes that an interim period and an interim self-government
will neither prejudice permanent Statehood, nor preempt it.20
The DOP calls for an interim agreement. Article VII of the
DOP states: "[t]he Israeli and Palestinian delegations will nego-
tiate an agreement on the interim period."'2  Thus, the DOP set
the stage for the establishment of a Palestinian self-government
for a transitional period, pending permanent settlement. This
interim self-government was inaugurated pursuant to the Gaza-
Jericho Agreement. Under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the PA
assumed the powers and authorities in civil matters, which were
transferred by Israel.22 Later, in 1995, the Interim Agreement
incorporated the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.
23
Chapter 1, Article I(1) of the Interim Agreement calls for
the establishment of the Palestinian Council. According to the
16. The PLO, in its internationally-recognized capacity as the sole legitimate repre-
sentative of all Palestinian people in the occupied territories, the Diaspora, and refugee
camps in the Arab countries (Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan), signed the DOP and subse-
quent agreements with Israel. The PLO authorized the creation of the Palestinian Au-
thority ("PA"). The PLO continues to maintain foreign relations and to sign interna-
tional agreements on behalf of the PA.
17. This was the first time that the PLO and the Government of Israel negotiated
directly with one another.
18. DOP, supra n.1, art. I.
19. Id.
20. When the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon took office and immedi-
ately declared that the peace process was over and that the signed Agreements were no
longer binding, the impact on the Palestinian people was severe. The announcement
was translated into a negation of the people's right to Statehood, agreed to in the DOP
and the Interim Agreement.
21. DOP, supra n.1, art. VII.
22. Interim Agreement, supra n.4, art. 1(2).
23. Id. arts. XXXI(2)-(3).
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Article, this Council shall assume the powers, responsibilities,
and liabilities of the PA. Paragraph (2) of the Article states:
"The term 'Council' throughout this Agreement shall, pending
the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the
Palestinian Authority. ' 24 To date, however, the term "Palestin-
ian Authority" remains operative and the term "Council" was
never replaced.25
The PA was vested with the executive, legislative, 26 and judi-
cial powers. The Palestinian legislature was named the "Palestin-
ian Legislative Council" ("PLC"). The President of the PA was
elected in January 1996 and members of the PLC were elected
two months later.27  The members of the PLC elected the
Speaker. The Interim Agreement expressly excluded the follow-
ing from its scope: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security ar-
rangement, borders, and other issues of common interest.28
These issues were reserved for the permanent agreement.29
B. Limitations on the Powers of the Palestinian Authority
Under the Agreements, the PA functions as an interim,
semi-autonomous self-government. 3 However, by operation of
the permanent exclusions enumerated in Article XXXI of the
Interim Agreement, the PA cannot have clearly-defined "final"
borders or contiguous geographical areas .3  Therefore, it can-
not effectively control the external or internal movement of its
24. Id. arts. 111(2) and XVIII.
25. Gaza-Jericho Agreement, supra n.2. It seems that the Palestinians, the Israelis,
and the rest of the world, remained comfortable using the term "Palestinian Authority."
26. The PLC has a Speaker and eighty-eight members. Two of these members are
deceased, one has resigned, and one is detained by Israel. The PLC also has various
specialized committees.
27. The Interim Agreement along with Annex II, "Protocol on Election," call for
the election of the President and the legislature. See Interim Agreement, supra n.4, art.
II and Annex II. Among the first laws promulgated by the PA, was the Elections Law of
1995. See Palestinian Elections Law, Law No. 15 of 1995, issued in Gaza on Dec. 7, 1995.
28. Interim Agreement, supra n.4, art. XXXI(5).
29. Id.
30. The PA has a population of 3,298,951 people in the West Bank and Gaza.
31. There is wide-ranging academic debate, however, as to whether Palestine
meets the international requirements for Statehood. Some have argued that the PA
meets the criteria for Statehood under international law. Under these criteria, a State
must possess a defined territory and a permanent population under the control of an
authority exercising governmental functions and capable of conducting foreign rela-
tions. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 229 (2d ed.
1980).
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people, goods, services, and trade, or its scarce and limited natu-
ral resources.12 Although this is a recognized critical shortcom-
ing of the Interim Agreement, the Palestinians understood that
it would be short-lived. Had a final agreement been reached by
the end of the fifth year of the Interim Agreement, as intended
by the DOP and the Interim Agreement, the adverse conse-
quences that the PA experienced in the exercise of its rights and
obligations, may have been less aggravated and more palatable.
Yet, when these shortcomings combined with derogations and
Israel's policy of closures, the PA private sector could no longer
operate and the PA economy collapsed. 3
The key to further understanding the shortcomings of the
PA lies in the nature and the scope of the implicit limitations
inherent in the Interim Agreement, especially with respect to
the powers and authorities of the PA. In order to appreciate
these implicit limitations, however, it is important to remember
that the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations from Madrid in 1991, to
the Interim Agreement in 1995, were conducted in the frame-
work of Occupied Territories, where Israel exercised jurisdiction
and administrative functions." Accordingly, Israel was the
source of the PA authority and, in that capacity, it conferred
powers on the PA. Thus, the grant of powers and responsibilities
was in Israel's discretion. In its negotiations with the PLO,
Israel also distinguished among functional, territorial, and per-
sonal jurisdiction. As a result, Israel was in a position to reserve
many powers for itself and to make significant exceptions. Israel
was further successful in narrowing the grant of powers between
the DOP and the Interim Agreement.:
The Palestinian negotiators were able to extract written
commitments. Effective control, due to the nature of the Agree-
ments, had limitations. Article I(1) of the Interim Agreement
states: "Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities ... to the
32. See discussion infra Part I.B.1-3.
33. See discussion infra Part II.
34. All facets of daily life in the Occupied Territories were under Israel's adminis-
trative and jurisdictional control, including civil, criminal, educational, judicial, and
economic matters.
35. Israel insisted on interim, gradual, and protracted transfer of authority instead
of a full comprehensive peace treaty, as was signed with Egypt in 1978 and with Jordan
in 1994. See Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, supra n.5; see also, Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty,
supra n.5.
36. See discussion infra Part I1.
[Vol. 26:500
PALESTINIAN A UTHORITY
Council [PA] . . ."" The Interim Agreement further adds that
once the PA is inaugurated, the Israeli Civil Administration will
be dissolved.3" However, Article I(1) states that "Israel shall con-
tinue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so trans-
ferred.""9 This means that some powers and responsibilities are
residual and are retained by Israel.4" The Israeli Civil Adminis-
tration was not dissolved, but lay dormant. Israel controlled
movement between Gaza and the West Bank by a system of per-
mits, in spite of the express language of Article IX(2) (a) of An-
nex I of the Interim Agreement, which states: "[M]ovement of
people, vehicles and goods in the West Bank, among cities,
towns, villages and refugee camps, will be free and normal, and
shall not be effected through checkpoints or roadblocks."41 In
practical terms, the rules were relaxed, but the Israeli Civil Ad-
ministration maintained its presence and imposed restrictions.
Today, during the present political crisis,42 Israel reemphasized
the role of the Civil Administration. No permits are issued, ex-
cept for humanitarian cases; limited numbers of permits are is-
sued to the Palestinian medical and emergency personnel. Even
entry of emergency food supplies and humanitarian assistance is
subject to the permit policy. The free flow of commerce has
come to near paralysis, businesses default on loans, banks limit
extension of credit, and the productive capacity of the economy
has come to a halt.
1. Territorial Jurisdiction
A look at the DOP and the Interim Agreement illustrates
the limitations on PA's territorial jurisdiction. In the Interim
Agreement, Israel successfully limited the scope of PA's territo-
rial jurisdiction, narrowing it even more than did the DOP. Ac-
cordingly, a close reading of Article XVII of the Interim Agree-
ment shows that it excluded from PA's jurisdiction more than it
included.
The PA's jurisdiction articulated in the DOP included the
37. Interim Agreement, supra n.4, art. I(1).
38. Id. art. 1(5).
39. Id. art. I (1).
40. Id. art. 1(5) (b) (i).
41. Id. Annex 1, Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements
[hereinafter Annex I].
42. See discussion infra nn.62-77 and accompanying text.
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"West Bank and Gaza Strip territory."43 Under the Interim
Agreement, the authority of the PA "encompasses all matters
that fall within its territorial, functional and personal jurisdic-
tion."4 4 In other words, the Interim Agreement qualified the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the West Bank and Gaza, excluded the set-
tlements and military installations areas, and further limited this
territorial jurisdiction in the West Bank by making the with-
drawal of Israeli military forces gradual.
Israel divided the West Bank into three territorial jurisdic-
tional areas: A, B, and C. 45 Under this arrangement, the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the PA consisted of areas A and B. Area A was
made up of eight Arab cities in the West, where the PA exercised
both civil and security jurisdiction, without interference by the
Israeli army. 4" Area B consisted of the smaller towns and vil-
lages, where the PA exercised civil jurisdiction only; Israel exer-
cised security control.4 7 In Area C of the West Bank, which also
included Israeli settlements with large areas around them, Israel
exercised both civil and security jurisdiction.41
The withdrawal or redeployment of Israeli military forces
from the West Bank and Gaza was to be carried out in a phased
process.49 The first phase was to include withdrawal from the
populated areas of the West Bank (cities, towns, villages, refugee
camps, and hamlets) and would be concluded twenty-two days
prior to the Palestinian elections,"' which would be held in Janu-
ary 1996. Eighteen months after the Palestinian elections,
around the middle of 1997, the second redeployment was to be
completed.5' The Palestinian police was to be deployed and to
assume the responsibility for public order and internal secur-
ity.5" The third and final redeployment was scheduled to begin
in mid-1997 and to end before the end of 1997.51
Israeli redeployment is significant because of the size of the
43. DOP, supra n.1, art. IV.
44. Interim Agreement, supra n.4, art. XVII.
45. Id. art. XI(3).
46. Id. art. XI(2) and maps in appendix A, available at www.arij.org.
47. Id. art. XI(2) and maps in appendix A, available at www.arij.org.
48. Id. art. XI(2) and maps in appendix A, available at www.arij.org.
49. Id. art. X.
50. Id. art. X(1).
51. Id. art. X(2).
52. Id. art. X(3).
53. Id. art. XI(2)(d).
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area that would have come under direct and sole Palestinian
control. The first redeployment from area A comprised 1% of
the West Bank and the second redeployment from area B com-
prised 27% of the West Bank. Excluding settlements and mili-
tary locations, the remaining area C comprised 72% of the West
Bank.54 According to the foregoing schedule, all withdrawals
were to take place within three years. The PA was to exercise full
territorial jurisdiction over its area by the time the final status
discussions commenced.55 Settlements and military location
would be settled in permanent discussions.
Yet, phases two and three did not take place as scheduled.56
On January 15, 1997, Israel made one reconciliatory attempt for
not having redeployed from the West Bank city of Hebron 57 - it
signed the Hebron Protocol."
The PA never exercised jurisdiction over its areas because
the Israeli military forces did not redeploy pursuant to the stipu-
lations in the Interim Agreement. The Israeli breach of the In-
terim Agreement terms on redeployment had tremendous im-
pact on the economy and the movement of people in the West
Bank and Gaza. Annex I, Article 1(2) of the Interim Agreement
states:
In order to maintain the territorial integrity of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, and to promote
their economic growth and the demographic and geographi-
cal links between them, both sides shall implement the provi-
sions of this Annex, while respecting and preserving without
obstacles, normal and smooth movement of people, vehicles,
and goods within the West Bank, and between the West Bank
54. Id. art. XI(3) and maps in appendix A, available at www.arij.org, (showing the
size of the area).
55. Israel insisted on interim, gradual, and protracted transfer of authority, instead
of a full, comprehensive peace treaty, as was signed with Egypt in 1978 and Jordan in
1994. See Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, supra n.5. See aLsoJordan-Israel Peace Treaty, supra
n.5.
56. See Annex I, supra n.41.
57. Id. art. VII(1)(a). Special guidelines were agreed upon regarding the City of
Hebron (known as "Area H-l"). Article VII(1)(b) states that "redeployment will be
completed not later than six months after the signing of this Agreement." Id.
58. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (Jan. 17 1977), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il. The separate Protocol illustrates Israeli backing from the terms
of the Interim Agreement regarding the city of Hebron. Days before redeployment,
Israel announced suspension of withdrawal. Id.
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and the Gaza Strip. 1
The breach lies in the fact that "normal and smooth movement
of people, vehicles and goods within the West Bank" was not
achieved. Moreover, the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza
and the normal movement of people did not occur. Annex I,
Article 1(4) of the Interim Agreement states:
After the inauguration of the Palestinian Council [PA], the
unity and integrity of the Palestinian people in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip shall be maintained and respected. All
Palestinian people residing in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip will be accountable to the Palestinian Council [PA]
only, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement."'
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Annex I, Article 1(7) of the In-
terim Agreement states: "Nothing in this Article shall derogate
from Israel's security powers and responsibilities in accordance
with this Agreement."61 Thus, the inconsistent language of the
Interim Agreement, as demonstrated in paragraph 4(2) of Arti-
cle I, played in favor of Israel and confirmed that even after the
initial withdrawal, Israel retained overriding responsibilities.
By retaining these significant responsibilities, Israel con-
firmed that it did not intend to dissolve the Military Administra-
tion over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To this effect, Israel
maintained its legal standing on the so-called "security offenses"
- defined and administrative detentions imposed prior to 1993.
In other words, Israeli security forces could continue the process
of arresting, trial, and detention of Palestinians in areas where
the PA had "full" jurisdiction (areas A and B) and 'joint" juris-
diction (area C).2
Palestinian use of its own airspace and waters on the coast of
Gaza did not fall under the PAjurisdiction either.6" By contrast,
59. Annex I, supra n.41, art. 1(2).
60. Id. art. 1(4).
61. Id. art 1(7).
62. Id. art. XVII.
63. Id. art. XIII(l). According to Annex 1, Article XIII(l) of the Interim Agree-
ment, the PA may use its airspace for three purposes only: (1) two transport helicopters
may be used for VIP transportation within and between the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip; (2) a maximum of three helicopters may be used for the purpose of transport
missions to approved landing pads; and (3) three fixed-wing transport aircraft with up
to thirty-five person capacity may be used for transporting persons between the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. Pursuant to paragraph (4) of this Article, all aviation activity
is subject to the Israeli approval and Israeli air traffic control. Paragraph (3) authorizes
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Israeli use of the PA airspace and coastal waters, civil or military,
was not subject to any limitation. The sea off the coast of the
Gaza Strip was divided into three Maritime Activity Zones: K, L,
and M. 4 These zones hindered the fishing industry - an eco-
nomic lifeline for Gazans. Only zone L was open for fishing. 5
Zones K and M were closed areas; navigation was restricted to
the Israeli Navy. The area off zone L extended twenty nautical
miles into the sea from the coast.6" Fishing was not permitted in
the open sea.67 Further, the DOP called for the establishment of
a Gaza seaport." Construction began but was halted, especially
after Israel destroyed the first phases of the construction during
its incursions into Gaza in the early 2002.
These limitations could not have paved the way for decreas-
ing dependence on economic activity on the Israeli side. By its
careful drafting of the provisions and the exclusions - explicitly
or implicitly - Israel ensured that it would have the upper hand
in the implementation and the interpretation of the breadth of
PA's territorial and functional jurisdictions. As a result, eco-
nomic activity suffered a downturn.
2. Functional Jurisdiction
The Interim Agreement transferred functional jurisdiction
and authority to the PA. Article XVII(2) (b) of the Interim
Agreement sets out the scope of the transferred powers and re-
sponsibilities.69 Although the powers and the responsibilities
were clearly enumerated in this Agreement, there were two sets
the PA to establish an airstrip in Gaza. Paragraph (13) mentions the commercial use of
the Gaza airstrip for passenger flights. This paragraph talks about service between Gaza
and Cairo only, whereby two fixed-wings aircraft, with a maximum of fifty passengers,
are allowed. Effectively, the airstrip, completely destroyed by the Israeli air force during
the March 29, 2002 military incursions known as "Operation Defensive Shield," was not
available for commercial/cargo operation and thus, could not substitute for the Israeli
ports (sea and air) with respect to commercial/cargo aviation. This paragraph ex-
pressly precludes the PA from having air service with countries that do not have bilat-
eral relations with Israel. Id.
64. Id. art. XIV.
65. Id. art. XIV(I)(a)(2)(b).
66. Id. art. XIV(I) (a) (2) (a).
67. Id. art. X1V(1) (a) (2) (b) (i).
68. DOP, supra n.1, art. VII(4).
69. Interim Agreement, supra n.4, Annex III, App. I [hereinafter Annex III]
(describing the powers and the responsibilities transferred to the PA). Examples in-
clude health, education, local government, land registration, commercial register, agri-
culture, and parks. ]d.
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of exceptions. The first exception set out the areas where the
Israeli militaryl' retained authority - those areas that did not
come under the functional jurisdiction of the PA. Here, the
powers and the responsibilities were not transferred to the PA
and Palestinian personal jurisdiction over Israelis residing in the
Palestinian areas was limited. The second exception involved
the powers and the authorities which were transferred to the PA,
but were not comprehensive. The numerous spheres where the
transfer was not complete include agriculture; health; archeol-
ogy; land; planning and zoning; environment; labor; electricity;
gas; fuel; nature reserves; tourism; quarries; electromagnetic
sphere; and international telecommunications.
In addition to the exceptions of final status, Annex III of the
Interim Agreement enumerates items such as airspace and water
resources."' Article XVII(2) (d) gives the PA functional jurisdic-
tion over area C, whose territorial jurisdiction remains with
Israel. This means that the PA has civil jurisdiction over Pales-
tinians in its areas, but Israel's military government continues to
exercise the powers and the responsibilities related to security,
public order, and other non-transferred spheres.
3. Personal Jurisdiction
The third type of limitation embodied in the Interim Agree-
ment relates to the nature of the transferred personal jurisdic-
tion. Article XVII(2) (c) excludes Israelis living in areas under
PA's jurisdiction, unless they consent to the jurisdiction of a Pal-
estinian court in civil matters. In criminal matters, the PA is pre-
cluded from exercising any jurisdiction over Israelis.72 By con-
trast, Palestinians are subject to Israeli jurisdiction. In fact, the
line of distinction between civil and security matters is blurry.
For example, no Palestinian travel document v3 personal identifi-
70. The Israeli military government was not dissolved. Article XVII (4) (b) of the
Interim Agreement states that "the Israeli military government shall retain the neces-
sary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities . . ." Interim Agree-
ment, supra n.4, art. XVII(4) (b). In fact, the government did not stop issuing military
orders and Orders 1433-1441 were issued in the first four months of 1996. A number of
regulations were also issued.
71. Id.
72. These exclusions are not reciprocal, since Palestinians are subject to the civil
and criminal jurisdiction of Israel.
73. The PA cannot issue passports to its citizens unilaterally. The Israeli civil au-
thorities retain overriding powers in this sphere.
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cation number, or residency card may be issued without a prior
approval by Israel.74
By operation of rules guiding personal jurisdiction, the Is-
raelis have lodged thousands of complaints against the Palestini-
ans since 1994. The Israeli courts have ruled ex parte whenever a
Palestinian was not properly served with process.75 Moreover,
numerous Palestinians have not been granted permits to enter
Israel7 6 to appeal their cases after an unfavorable judgment by
an Israeli court. Additionally, the Israeli Military Administration
executed monetary awards by deducting the award from the PA
tax revenues collected by the Israeli side.77
These practices have impacted the ability of Palestinian
businesses to bring legal action on commercial breaches, and
limited the power of the Palestinians courts. Moreover, the pri-
vate sector felt precluded from obtaining redress.
C. Temporal and Transitional Impact of the Interim Agreement
The Interim Agreement had temporal limits. It was to end
five years from execution, i.e., in May 1999, as declared in the
DOP. The transitional nature and the open-ended framework of
the Interim Agreement generated uncertainty and anxiety about
Statehood. A series of disappointments replaced the high hopes
and a much-anticipated peace treaty. Article XXXI(5) of the In-
terim Agreement -states that the " [P] ermanent status negotia-
tions will commence ... not later than May 4, 1996." Paragraph
74. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are residents until sovereign is-
sues are determined regarding their permanent status.
75. Service of process between Israel and the PA is to be effected through the PA
in the case of Palestinian defendants and through the Israeli Military Forces ("IMF") in
the case of Israeli defendants. See Interim Agreement, supra n.4, Annex IV, Protocol
Concerning Legal Affairs, art. 11(9) (a) (2). In fact, on security grounds, the Israeli side
through its Military Forces has not effected any service of process made by the Palestin-
ian side against Israeli defendants in civil cases. The PA has often argued that the
prospective monetary awards are held in trust or escrow by Israel pursuant to the In-
terim Agreement and thus, Israel is precluded from making unilateral decisions.
76. Note that the West Bank and Gaza citizens are not allowed entry into Israel,
except as specified by Israel. See Annex I, supra n.41, art. IX.
77. See AL-Quns, Dec. 12, 2002 (author's trans.) (on file with author). This lead-
ing Arabic daily newspaper reported an Israeli court decision to award a multimillion
judgment to an Israeli supplier. The damages were deducted from the PA revenues
held in Israel. Id. See also AL-Quos, Dec. 28, 2002 (author's trans.) (on file with author)
(reporting that a Tel Aviv District Court rendered judgment ex pane in favor of the
Israeli bus company, Eggid, for damages sustained in acts of violence). The Court also
fined the PA and President Yasir Arafat for not appearing.
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(6) of this Article states that permanent status negotiations will
be "conducted pursuant to the DOP." The DOP, Article I,
speaks about U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 of 1967 and
338 of 1973.78 Under Article X of the Interim Agreement, Israel
was to redeploy from the West Bank. The three scheduled rede-
ployments during the five-year term of the interim period did
not fully materialize.7 9 The physical movement required to turn
the engine of the economy was stifled; the territorial integrity of
the West Bank and Gaza was not achieved.
Final status negotiations between the Palestinians and the
Israelis were to commence three years prior to the lapse of the
Interim Agreement. In effect, by May 2000, Israel continued to
exercise full control over 71% of the West Bank and 30% of the
Gaza Strip, as the agreed upon redeployment did not fully mate-
rialize. The movement of people and goods within the West
Bank and between the West Bank and Gaza remained under the
control of Israel. The PA retained a quasi-territorial and semi-
functional authority at best.
These were the prevailing conditions at the time of the
Camp David Summit of 2000. At the Summit, the Palestinian
side had serious misgivings. Both parties, in their own ways,
were not ready for an end of conflict agreement - i.e. a peace
treaty.
D. PA Accomplishments from 1994 to 2000
When the PA assumed responsibilities, conditions were ad-
verse and difficult. It faced a highly complex subset of arrange-
ments in the face of considerable post-conflict issues, responsi-
bilities, and dilemmas. Under the Interim Agreement, the PA
became responsible for a multitude of functions, including elec-
tions; security and public order; economic matters; civil affairs;
78. U.N. Resolution 242, supra n.11, para. 1(i) (promising "[W]ithdrawal of Israel
armed forces from territories occupied in recent conflict"). See also U.N. Resolution
338 (Concerning the October War), U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (1973).
79. One redeployment took place when Israel withdrew from Jericho and parts of
Gaza in May 1994, and another very limited one under Netanyahu, namely, along the
lines of the Hebron Protocol. Barak refused to carry out the third redeployment that
he himself had renegotiated under the Sharm al-Sheikh Agreement in September 1999.
He insisted on moving to the final status negotiations directly. It is often overlooked
that Barak, as Minister of Interior under the Rabin government, had actually voted
against the Interim Agreement, at a time when the peace process was at its peak.
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the judiciary and the court system - all without institutional ca-
pacity or skilled public civil servants.
Against the limitations set out in the Interim Agreement as
described above, the PA started the discourse of building institu-
tions and exercising its limited authorities. The PA was thus ex-
pected to build public institutions capable of promoting good
governance, a democratic political system, a pluralist civil soci-
ety, and a free market economy. In the best of circumstances,
the process would have been difficult. Yet, with limited and
semi-autonomous control, the PA came a long way. The Presi-
dent and the legislature were democratically elected; public ser-
vice began to operate; pluralism began to emerge; the rule of
law began to function; and the economy began to develop.
Despite the lack of political stability, the PA succeeded in
establishing a functioning government with a national mandate,
which was able to create much of the needed institutional and
regulatory framework for improving living conditions and stimu-
lating economic growth in the Palestinian territory. The PA was
able to accomplish this even though it did not have exclusive
jurisdiction over the legal and the administrative systems that
served its people, and it lacked access to external markets. By
the same token, the PA had limited control over its natural re-
sources such as land and water. A large share of its operating
budget and fiscal accounts was dependent on transfers of taxes
and duties collected by Israel."'
The PA established a Ministerial Cabinet, delivered educa-
tion and health care, administered tax collection, improved road
and transportation infrastructure, and built a power generation
plant8 in the Gaza Strip. It established a modern Securities Ex-
80. See WORLD BANK, FIFrEEN MONTIIS - INTIFADA, CLOSURES AND PALESTINIAN Ec-
ONOMIC CRISIS, AN ASSESSMENT (2002) [hereinafter FIFIEEN MONTiS - INTIFADA]. Ac-
cording to this report, PA revenue fell from a monthly average of US$91 million in
March of 2000, to US$21 million by April of 2001. The PA also accumulated US$340
million in arrears. These arrears had a major impact on the Palestinian private sector.
There were acute liquidity shortages, rising non-performing loans in the banking sys-
tem, and increasing cases of insolvency. Id.
81. Strategic partners were brought in to build and operate the power plant. The
delivery of electricity in Gaza was unreliable and power shortages and blackouts were
regular occurrences. Israel did not develop the electricity grids for Gaza, as required
under the Interim Agreement. See Annex II1, supra n.69, App. I, art. 10. The West
Bank fared better. Although the PA was able to establish an independent Palestinian
electricity supply system, it purchased electricity from the Israel Electric Company pur-
suant to a commercial agreement.
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change 82 and a state-of-the-art telecommunications network,
fixed and cellular.83 Its legislature enacted and is in the process
of enacting numerous laws to support the development of the
economy 84 and to modernize the laws. Its Cabinet presented the
PLC with a general budget.15
However, the PA faced significant challenges. Its perform-
ance suffered from
" inefficient delivery of services;
" lack of inter-ministerial coordination and information sys-
tems necessary for coherent planning;
* a large number of public institutions;
* an inflated number of civil servants;
* high public service administration;
* limited vision and policy planning;
* lack of a full governmental financial information system;
* a limited delegation of authorities and responsibilities from
the Executive to its ministries and agencies;
* an overlap in powers and authorities of ministries and official
agencies;
* a limited role of local government;
* a limited oversight by the PLC over the Executive;
* an absence of a clear line of authority between the Executive
and the judiciary;
* an absence of a uniform administrative system between the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip;
* a lack of a system for accountability and transparency;
" a limited expertise of top and middle level civil servants base;
* highly complex and unstructured judiciary and court systems;
* an absence of a constitutional base for the PA; and
82. The Stock Exchange is also operated under a license by a private investment
entity.
83. The PA awarded a license to a private investment enterprise to operate the
telecommunications sector. Note, however, that under Article 36 of Annex III of the
Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs, the delivery of international telecommunications re-
mained vested with the Israeli side pending final status, but at present, is subject to
commercial arrangements. See Annex Ill, supra n.69, App. I, art.36.
84. These include relevant laws in the following areas: arbitration, banking, civil
and criminal procedure, commercial, competition/antitrust, corporations, environ-
mental, intellectual property, investment, labor, securities, taxation, telecommunica-
tions, and trade.
85. There were, however, problems with timely delivery and the breakdown of
budget items.
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* a lack of long-term strategic policy formulation. 6
The impact of these challenges on the economic and pri-
vate spheres was adverse. It discouraged investors and created
high risk and uncertainty. It also jeopardized the investment of
foreign capital and created PA monopolies and interference in
the operation of the free market economy.8 7
E. Camp David and the Events of September 28, 2000
The political climate on the eve of the Camp David Summit,
held in July 2000 at the invitation of the President of the United
States, was charged and plagued with five years of disappoint-
ments and setbacks. There was bitterness and mistrust. Israel
continued to build settlements, confiscate land settlements, and
bypass roads. Actions that were of "irreversible" nature and in
breach of the Interim Agreement took place.8 8 Israel had not
fully redeployed from the West Bank and Gaza, as explained
above. Effectively, the PA entered the Camp David Summit with
only 18% under its full control in area A and 24% under partial
control in area B. This was contrary to the original understand-
ing that the Israeli withdrawal from the vast majority of the West
Bank would be completed during the interim period."
On the economic level, there was slight recovery from the
recession experienced from 1996 to 199890 - closures were in-
frequent, Palestinian labor in Israel was bringing in remittances,
86. See generally COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, TASK FORCE REPORT: STRENGTHEN-
ING PALESTINIAN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (1999). See also, Victoria Wagner, Palestinian Judi-
ciary and the Rule of Law in the Autonomous Areas, PASSIA (2000); FIFTEEN MONTHS -
INTIFADA, supra n.80.
87. See FIAS, Enhancing Prospects for Foreign Direct Investment in the West Bank and
Gaza (Aug. 2001). According to this study, the private sector cited the following factors:
weak legal and regulatory environment (78%); corruption/PA involvement in the econ-
omy (47%); lack of information on the economy (47%); lack of infrastructure and facil-
ities (26%); and weak law enforcement and court systems (16%). Id. See also World
Bank, Governance and the Business Environment in the West Bank/Gaza (Working Paper No.
23, 2001).
88. See Interim Agreement, supra n.4, art. XXXI(7) (stating that neither side shall
initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations); see also W. Thomas Malli-
son & Sally V. Mallison, The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order (1986)
(discussing the legal status of settlements in the Occupied Territories under interna-
tional law).
89. See Rema Hammami & Salim Tamari, The Second Uprising: End or New Begin-
nings, 30(2) J. OF PALESTINE STUD. 5, 7 (2001).
90. FIFTEEN MONTHS - INTFADA, supra n.80.
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transaction costs fell, and private sector capital investment in-
creased.' Israel was experiencing an economic boom and the
Palestinian economy benefited as labor opportunities and ex-
ports were enhanced.?2 Yet, the productivity of the Palestinian
economy was on decline. Overall growth prospects were limited
- sustained progress was not on the horizon and employment
in the PA was saturated. According to the World Bank, real
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") was projected to grow at a rate
of 4%-5% with real per capita income stagnant and unemploy-
ment and poverty on the rise. For these reasons, the Palestinian
economy was vulnerable, especially to external shocks, like clo-
sures. Economic structural reforms were required to sustain pri-
vate sector activity."
At the same time, Camp David was the American effort to
create a summit environment that would bring about the elusive
final status agreement. Prior to Camp David, in October 1999,
the former President Bill Clinton invited Arafat and Netanyahu
to the Wye River Plantation. After days of haggling and no suc-
cess, ex-President Clinton threw in his weight and the result was
the Wye River Memorandum 4 signed on October 23, 1998."
In May 1999, Prime Minister Ehud Barak was elected. As the
term of ex-President Clinton's presidency was nearing the end,
he was encouraged by Barak's election and made his last bid for
a final status agreement. He called for the Camp David Summit.
At the Summit, Barak maintained the following Israeli official
policy on final status: Israel would neither withdraw to the June
4, 1967 border; remove all settlements erected after 1967; with-
draw from parts of East Jerusalem occupied in 1967; nor grant
rights of return to the Palestinian refugees. President Arafat ar-
ticulated the Palestinian position in the following terms: Israel
should withdraw to the 1967 border, including all parts of East
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Rosa A. Valdisvieso et al., West Bank and Gaza, Economic Performance, Prospects
and Policies (Int'l Monetary Fund 2001).
94. See David Makovsky, A Wye Diary, HA'ARPTZ, Oct. 25, 1998 (author's trans.) (on
file with author).
95. Netanyahu turned over a small area in the north of the West Bank but refused
to turn over other agreed-on parts on security grounds. This was in spite of the calm
experienced in 1998-1999. In fact, former U.S. President Clinton, in a gesture of good
will, visited the Gaza Strip and landed at the Gaza airstrip. This marked the first time a
U.S. President visited the PA.
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Jerusalem occupied in 1967; Palestinian refugees should have
the right of return with compensation; and a Palestinian State
with East Jerusalem as its capital should be established.96
Although Camp David was ground-breaking in that thorny
and difficult issues were brought to the table - including Jerusa-
lem, borders, refugees, and settlement - the two sides were not
ready for final concessions and time was short. During Camp
David, the Palestinians were alarmed at the prospect of having to
re-concede the already negotiated withdrawals. Palestinian lead-
ership was making a sharp distinction between final concessions
and the interim concessions they had made only to reach an in-
terim arrangement. The interim concessions included border
control, bypass roads, movement, and water. At Camp David,
the Palestinian leadership set out its "red lines." It made clear
that the concessions on movement and water were limited to an
interim phase and made for an interim period only.
By most accounts in the United States and Israel, the negoti-
ations were dubbed a failure. This was the official Israeli view
echoed by the Clinton administration because the Palestinians
"rejected" Barak's "generous" offer. A close examination of the
talks reveals that major disagreement centered on Jerusalem and
the Israeli demand for sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif"
Indeed, the Palestinian leadership rejected this demand for Is-
raeli sovereignty over the third holiest place in Islam.98 Various
opinions have been expressed since the end of Camp David.
These opinions are divided about what had happened at Camp
David. Recent analyses about the content of the Israeli offer ex-
plained where the talks had ended.9
96. See generally William B. Quandt, Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 30(2) J. OF
PALESTINE STUD. 26-40 (2001). See also Akaram Hanieh, The Camp David Papers, 30(2) J.
OF PALESTINE STUD. 75, 94-95 (2001).
97. It is known to the West and Israel as "the Temple Mount."
98. In the history of Zionism and since its first Congress in 1897, never has a Zion-
ist leader made a demand for al-Haram al-Sharif. To have Barak, a secular Socialist,
demand sovereignty over it and to have ex-President Clinton, a liberal secular Demo-
crat, endorse the demand, was a call for ending the negotiations. See Walid Khalidi,
Speech Upon Receiving the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organi-
zation's Prize of Distinction in Cultural Achievement in the Arab World at Brunei Gal-
lery, SOAS (Oct. 8, 2002).
99. The Israelis and the Palestinians agreed that the complexities of the final status
negotiations that led to ending the talks inhered in three main issues. These were: (1)
the Israeli proposal to have sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area
where the Muslims would control the ground level and the Israelis would control the
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Despite the setback at Camp David, the former President
Clinton made the last effort in December 2000. He proposed
the creation of a Palestinian State on 95% of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. The Palestinian State would have sovereignty over
certain Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Refugees
would return but be restricted to the Palestinian State itself. Fur-
ther, an international monitoring force would be brought in at
the Palestinian-Israeli borders. Arafat and Barak agreed that this
proposal was the basis for further discussions.0 0
In the meantime, the present Prime Minister of Israel, Mr.
Ariel Sharon, then Head of the Likud Party, entered the Muslim
Holy site of al-Aqsa Mosque on September 28, 2000. Thousands
of Palestinian demonstrators took the streets the next day. The
Israeli Defense Forces ("IDF") shot to death several demonstra-
tors. This sparked the al-Aqsa Intifada. 0 ' However, looking be-
yond mere sparks, the entire climate had become charged by
then. Palestinians were sending a very loud message to ending
the status quo of unfulfilled promises and unending occupation.
Notwithstanding the setbacks, Arafat and Barak held a series
of meetings at the Egyptian resort town of Taba on the Red Sea
from January 21 through January 27, 2001. At Taba, only the
Palestinians and the Israelis participated. This was in contrast to
area below the surface - the so-called "vertically divided" sovereignty; (2) the Palestin-
ian request to have full sovereignty over all Palestinian areas of EastJerusalem; and (3)
the Israeli request for an "end of conflict" clause that would release Israel from all
further claims on any of the final status issues. The implication was that the Israeli
responsibility for Palestinian refugees would end forever. See Susan Akram, Palestinian
Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics and Implications for a just Solution, 31 (3) J.
OF PALESTINE STUD. 36-51 (2002). The proposed arrangement at Camp David included
a fifteen-year offer to return a few thousands of refugee families and to compensate the
rest. For this, the Palestinian leadership was to sign an "end of conflict" clause. The
offer was rejected. To have a few thousand out of a total of 2,193,200 refugees return,
would drive a wedge between Arafat and the Diaspora Palestinians. According to
United Nations Refugees Works Agency ("UNRWA"), Palestinian refugees registered
with it are present in Jordan (1,463,064 people), Lebanon (364,551 people), and Syria
(365,605 people). Id.
100. Quandt, supra n.96.
101. Heavy clashes ensued between Palestinian stone throwers and the Israeli po-
lice. The al-Aqsa Intifada spread to all cities, towns, villages, and refugee camps of the
West Bank and Gaza. Clinton tried to call calm and indeed held a small summit meet-
ing in October at Sharm al-Skeikh in Egypt. The meeting was attended by Yasir Arafat,
Ehud Barak, Hosni Mubarak, and Kofi Annan. Clinton announced that the parties
agreed to hold off violence and conduct an inquiry into the crisis. However, the cycle
of violence continued and the conflict became militarized with Israel resorting to exces-
sive use of force including fighter jets and tanks in Operation Defensive Shield.
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
the Camp David Summit, where Americans played a high profile
role. 1 12 In a joint statement made on January 27, the two sides
acknowledged engaging in "deep and practical talks.' 10 3 Yet,
time constraints precluded the parties from "reach[ing] under-
standings on all issues." 104
Thus, final status negotiations were replaced by mutual dis-
trust and violence. Facing these dilemmas, the PA immediately
went into a state of internal and external crisis. Domestically, it
faced a crisis on the economic, institutional, and development
levels. On the international level, it struggled with its standing
and credibility.
II. ECONOMY
A. Optimism and Peace Dividends
General optimism characterized the period following the
DOP and the signing of the Paris Protocol. The Israelis and the
Palestinians saw the potential mutual benefits inherent in eco-
nomic cooperation. The prevailing notion was that the peace
process, on the political level, could be strengthened through
economic "spill-over effects." The main incentive for investors
consisted of cashing in on the "peace dividends," while adhering
to the "principles of mutual respect for each other's economic
interests, reciprocity, equity and fairness," as stated in the Pream-
ble of the Paris Protocol.' °5 The Paris Protocol, after all, was
based on the establishment of a "contractual"" 6 agreement on
economic relations between the two sides.
From this optimistic perspective, Palestinian investors, and
to a certain extent foreign investors, neither anticipating the se-
curity issues, nor realizing the limiting functional aspects of the
Paris Protocol, launched multi-million investments. Before the
102. The Taba Talks were attended by the EU Special Envoy to the Middle East,
Miguel Moratinos. See Michael Moratinos, Nonpaper on the Taba Negotiations, Summer
2001, 31(3) J. OF PALESTINE STUD. 79, 79-80 (2002).
103. The negotiations were called off by Prime Minister Ehud Barak on January
27, as Israel was preparing for an election on February 6, 2001. Ehud Barak lost the
election; Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister.
104. See infra n.108.
105. Paris Protocol, supra n.3, Preamble.
106. None of the other agreements between the Israelis and the Palestinians,
whether signed before or after the Paris Protocol, included references to contractual
language. Perhaps the intent was to make derogation more difficult legally. The intent
of the drafters, however, is not clear.
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events of September 2002, the Palestinian private sector pro-
vided 75% of total employment in the West Bank and Gaza. 1 7
Regional cooperation, also a function of the peace process, was
launched. A series of regional economic summits were held
from 1994 to 1997.08 These summits underscored that peace
carried with it the prospect of dividends, as well as provided a
meeting forum for investors.
B. Background on the Economy
The Palestinian economy is small and poor compared to its
Israeli neighbor. It is, nevertheless, an open market economy.
During the period of Israeli occupation from 1967 to 1993, the
Palestinian economy was closely integrated with its Israeli neigh-
bor. The Palestinian import and export market was completely
dependent on the Israeli goods."' Effectively, the larger, more
advanced, and richer Israeli economy, absorbed the neighboring
smaller Palestinian economy.' "' Israeli economic, trade, and la-
bor policies shaped the economic and trade activity between the
Palestinian economy and the Israeli economy. Such total inte-
gration precluded the development of independent policies for
private sector growth and industrial development. Unskilled
and semiskilled labor constituted the main export to the Israeli
market and was, by far, the most significant contributor to the
Palestinian Gross National Product ("GNP"). Despite the lack of
capital investment in the Palestinian economy, GDP grew by
three-fold, but great disparities and inequalities existed.
Because the Palestinian economy was small and integrated
into the Israeli economy, it is important to understand the dy-
namics and polemics, During the first ten years after 1967, the
smaller Palestinian economy underwent a convergence with the
107. Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (on file with author).
108. Realizing a vision for regional economic cooperation, the United States, the
EU, and the World Economic Forum sponsored the Middle East and North Africa Eco-
nomic Summits. These took place in Casablanca in 1994; Amman in 1995; Cairo in
1996; and Doha in 1997. The PA did not participate in the fourth conference held in
Doha as a result of the tight closure policy imposed by Israel from 1996 to 1997.
109. 90% of West Bank imports came from Israel, while Israel absorbed about 50%
of the West Bank exports. Almost all Gaza imports came from Israel, while Israel ab-
sorbed about 82% of the Gaza exports.
110. The Israeli economy was thirty times bigger than the Palestinian economy in
terms of its Gross National Product ("GNP").
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Israeli economy.'' As a result, from 1968 to 1981, the Palestin-
ian GDP grew from 9% to 15% of that of Israel. 1 2 Yet, the con-
vergence had both positive and negative effects. On the positive
side, as a result of employment in and trade with Israel, a
"spread effect" occurred - income and economic activity in-
creased.' 13 The negative aspect, or "polarization effect," dimin-
ished the "spread effect." This was the consequence of the Is-
raeli policy practices and restrictions on the Palestinian use of
natural resources and productive economic activity, as well as
neglect of the creation of a Palestinian public sector.' 14 The two
economies continued to diverge during the 1994 to 2000 period
under the Interim Agreement and thereafter. The Palestinian
economy could not overcome years of dependence on Israel's
economy. Gaps in resources, labor market imbalances, sectoral
distortions, and infrastructure exist to this day.'
C. The Palestinian Economy and the Operation of the Paris Protocol
The peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis
brought about the Paris Protocol. The Paris Protocol was de-
signed to promote Palestinian economic growth and reduce the
gaps and distortions connected to Israel's economy experienced
from 1967 to 1993. The Interim Agreement transferred certain
authorities to the PA, a development that helped to directly pro-
mote business activity. The PA was in charge of licensing and
supervising industrial and commercial activity." 6 It also super-
vised the commercial register and the register of companies.' 17
Palestinians no longer needed permits from the Israeli Civil Ad-
ministration. A Palestinian treasury was established.'"" Palestin-
ian banks were set up and Arab banks that had been closed since
111. In 1967, the Israeli economy was ten times larger than the Palestinian econ-
omy. That year, Israel created a Customs Union with the West Bank and Gaza and
increased tariffs. The increase in tariffs and the creation of non-tariff barriers resulted
in diversion of the Palestinian economy from the economies of Arab and other foreign
markets. Meanwhile, a convergence with the Israeli economy took place. See Fadle M.
Naqib, Economic Relations Between Palestine and Israel During Occupation and Limited Self-
rule, ECONOMIC RESEARCh FORUM 2015 (Working Paper, 2000).
112. Id. at 7.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id. at 8-12.
115. Id.
116. Interim Agreement supra n.4, art.9(2).
117. Id. art. 23(3).
118. Id. art. 39.
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occupation, reopened their old locations and opened new
branches.'19 Under the Paris Protocol, a Palestinian Monetary
Authority (a central bank) was established, 120 even though the
PA could not issue its own currency. Legal tender consisted of
three currencies: the U.S. Dollar, the Israeli Shekel, and the
Jordanian Dinar. 121
Notwithstanding the improvements brought about by the
Interim Agreement and the Paris Protocol, the practical imple-
mentation of the Paris Protocol and the customs envelope cre-
ated within its scope, increased the potential to close the gap.
However, this gap reduction or elimination halted due to the
deteriorating security situation and closure policy. In fact, the
gap widened. Movement of people, vehicles, and goods became
more restricted.
With a wider gap between the two economies and the trans-
fer of quasi-functional authority to the PA, no viable develop-
ment of the Palestinian economy was feasible. Illustrative of the
limitations on authority are the following:
* predetermined nature and scope of Palestinian exports, with
a specific list of goods and destinations (Egypt and Jordan
only) as guide; 1 22
" revenue-sharing through Israeli tax collection; 123
" coordination of VAT and other indirect tax rates; 124
* continued access of Palestinian labor to the Israeli market; 21
and
" certain arrangements relating to agriculture, 26 industry, 127
and tourism. 128
The arrangements under the Paris Protocol gave Palestini-
ans some administrative autonomy over public service delivery,
and room for the formulation of policies of economic coopera-
119. Id. art. 4.
120. Paris Protocol, supra n.3, art. IV.
121. The absence of currency rendered monetary policy ineffective and affected
long-term lending policies. Because of mismatching, banks were discouraged from ex-
tending long-terms loans. This had a negative impact on investment and growth.
122. Paris Protocol, supra n.3, art. III.
123. Id. art. V.
124. Id. art. VI.
125. Id. art. VII.
126. Id. art. VIII.
127. Id. art. IX.
128. Id. art. X.
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tion. However, the grant of power and authority was not com-
plete. In the areas of agriculture, monetary matters, tourism,
standards, goods classification, valuation, and customs proce-
dures, Israel retained many facets of the powers. The limited
grant to the PA precluded better development of economic
planning. The Paris Protocol was therefore limiting in relation
to exchange of goods, fiscal policy, currency arrangements, and
labor services, which continued to constitute part of Israeli eco-
nomic policies because the Paris Protocol was not premised on
Palestinian economic growth. The language of the Paris Proto-
col was designed to permit the integration of the two economies
for the purpose of developing the Palestinian economy by close
integration, while allowing Israel to maintain effective control
over critical resources, such as electricity, international commu-
nications, land, and water. This precluded "reciprocity, equity
and fairness." Moreover, the Paris Protocol kept imports under
Israeli control and the collection of import taxes remained with
the customs authorities. The import taxes were transferred to
the PA after a deduction of an agreed-upon fee, as set out in
Article 111(15). These taxes became a major source of revenue
for the PA.
The limitations of the Paris Protocol and the peculiar terri-
torial division under the Interim Agreement - whereby Gaza
and the West Bank were not contiguous, while the West Bank
was divided into the areas A, B and C, each with distinct rules, a
legal status, and jurisdiction - burdened the Palestinian econ-
omy. The vagueness of Article IV of the Interim Agreement was
part of the problem. The Article states: "[T]he two sides view
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit,
whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period."' 29
The word "view," as used in the Article, carries a different mean-
ing for the Palestinians and for the Israelis. The presence of set-
tlements between the West Bank and Gaza and the nature of the
link between the two areas, made it impossible for the West Bank
and Gaza territories to remain without alterations.
The absence of progress on the political front with respect
to final status negotiations, prolonged the shortcomings of the
Paris Protocol. The transition period, designed to be short
under the Interim Agreement, never materialized. Thus, the
129. Interim Agreement, supra n.4, art. IV.
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permanent status economic arrangements were not made. Re-
current border closures, delays in opening the Gaza seaport on
the Mediterranean, restrictions, and intermittent operations of
the airport in Gaza, eroded sustained economic growth, result-
ing in increased vulnerability to external shocks.'
Hence, an adverse economic environment with a high de-
gree of risk, for both public and private investment, developed.
To this may be added the unpredictability in production, trade
under closure, and high transaction costs generated by the com-
plex procedures governing the transport of Palestinian trade
across the main borders with Jordan, Egypt, and Israel. Further-
more, PA's restricted jurisdiction over land and water resulted in
a scarcity of natural resources essential for productive develop-
ment.
D. Trade Regime and Other Constraints Under the Paris Protocol
The Palestinian trade regime, as envisioned in the Paris Pro-
tocol, did not provide an adequate basis for efficient Palestinian
economic growth.'' It included policies that were better suited
to the commercial interests of the much larger and stronger Is-
raeli economy." 2 The operation of the customs envelope, as set
out in the Paris Protocol, was the only available option for the
Palestinians, considering their insistence on continued access to
the Israeli market, and Israel's insistence on having no bor-
ders. 133
Thus, external tariff rates, excise tax rates, quality, and
safety measures were all decided by Israel." 4 In addition to
maintaining the range of subsidies, indirect taxes on certain im-
ports, and non-tariff barriers applied by Israel to protect its in-
dustries without enabling the PA to exercise similar policies, the
Protocol adopted Israeli regulations for imports from most third
130. See generally UNESCO, REPORT ON THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY (Gaza 2001).
131. One of the Side Letters to the Paris Protocol states that the two sides will
discuss "the prevention of Trade Restrictions."
132. See UNCTAD, The Palestinian economy and prospects for regional cooperation,
UNCTAD/GDS/SEU/2 (June 30, 1998). See also UNCTAD, Cooperation between the Pales-
tinian Authority, Egypt and Jordan to Enhance Subregional Trade-Related Services, UNCTAD/
GDS/SEU/3 (Feb. 14, 2000); UNCTAD, The Palestinian Economy: Achievements of the In-
terim Period and Tasks for the Future, UNCTAD/GDS/APP/1 (Jan. 19, 2001).
133. Ephrim Kleiman, The Economic Provisions of the Agreement Between Israel and the
PLO, 23 ISRAEL L. REv. 347-73 (1994).
134. Valdisvieso, supra n.93, at 93.
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parties. 13 5 Except for a limited group of products of specific
quantities to which the PA could apply its own rates, Palestinian
imports had to be subjected to a minimum of Israeli rates. 136
This rendered trade policies effectively identical to those of
Israel, making it impossible for the PA, in most cases, to bring
taxes upward or downward.
The Palestinian economy, by virtue of its association with
the Israeli trade regime, had to bear all the costs of trade liberali-
zation inherent in the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
membership, while having access to few of the benefits of liberal-
ization and WTO accession. Notwithstanding these shortcom-
ings, the Paris Protocol was intended to provide Palestinians with
opportunities to reap some benefits in the form of expanded
trade. However, border closures from 1996 to 1997, and from
2000 on, undermined such opportunities, and by so doing, effec-
tively set limits to the development possibilities of the Palestinian
economy. Not to mention, the preferential or free trade agree-
ments between the PA and regional and international partners
(Canada, Egypt, European Union ("EU"), Jordan, United States
of America, and countries of the Arab League) remain largely
dormant. Market access conditions have precluded their ex-
ploitation. 137
The Paris Protocol failed to include a clear mechanism for
its implementation. It called for the creation of the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee,' but was silent on the Committee's powers
and authorities. The Paris Protocol did not include an arbitra-
tion mechanism for dispute settlement, nor did it provide for a
third party intervenor who would arbitrate disputes.
There are additional constraints that are self-imposed by the
PA. They have compounded the limitations of the Paris Proto-
col and worked to preclude economic development. The PA did
not rehabilitate the infrastructure and public services in a rea-
sonable amount of time to provide an adequate foundation for
economic development. During the term of the Interim Agree-
135. Jd.
136. Paris Protocol, supra n.3, art. 111(2).
137. In effect, from 1993 to 1998, lost opportunities amounted to US$3 billion in
direct cumulative income. It should be remembered that in 1998, the real GNP in the
PA was US$ 3.96 billion and the real GDP was US$3.32 billion. Palestinian private in-
vestment slowed down and reflected declined sales and competitiveness.
138. Paris Protocol, supra n.3, art. 11.
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ment, the PA did not formulate a vision for economic develop-
ment and the special needs associated with it. Nor did it set
clear economic priorities or set up a capable public sector to
support the private sector. Instead, the PA permitted members
of its public sector to compete with the private sector, thereby
establishing PA's own commercial activity with little accountabil-
ity or transparency. These practices affected the economic pri-
orities of the PA and prevented the development of a central
and focused vision for rehabilitation and development. 39
E. Political Crises (1996-1998 and 2000-Present) and Impact on
the Economy
The deteriorated security situation and the imposition of
closures by Israel from 1996 to 1998 and from September 2000
on, resulted in a severe deterioration of the Palestinian econ-
omy. When Israel lifted closures as a security measure, the Pales-
tinian economy showed some expansion, as reflected in the PA
revenues, bank deposits, and bank credit. In fact, in 1999, the
PA requested that the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") as-
sist in preparing and monitoring a comprehensive medium-term
economic policy framework.1 "" The objective of this program
would be to enhance economic policy formulation to overcome
the challenges facing the Palestinian economy. During the ini-
tial phase of the program, the focus was on enhancing fiscal
management and governance; improving banking supervision;
strengthening the legal and regulatory framework; limiting the
uncontrolled expansion of the public employment; controlling
revenue diversion;... and improving overall conditions for pri-
vate sector investment. 14 2
As the PA embarked on new measures for sustained devel-
opment, the political situation took a turn for the worse. In par-
allel with the Palestinian al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel started to take
measures for gradual unilateral separation. The most significant
step associated with separation was the replacement of Palestin-
139. See generally Fadel Naqib & Nasser Atiani, The Present and Future Prospects with
the Israeli Economy (Palestine Economic Research Inst., Ramallah, West Bank 2002)
(draft for discussion) (author's trans.) (on file with author).
140. Valdisvieso, supra n.93, at 12.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Id.
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ian labor working in Israel with foreign labor. 4 Other mea-
sures that have had an adverse impact include: (1) tighter re-
strictions on the movement of goods within and through Israel
and among cities in the West Bank and Gaza; (2) tougher ar-
rangements concerning imports and exports that authorize
truck passage at certain military checkpoints, subject to the pro-
cess of downloading and a subsequent re-loading onto local
trucks before proceeding to the final destination; and (3) a
tighter system of permits for controlling the movement of Pales-
tinians within the West Bank and Israel.
These measures posed an immediate challenge to the Pales-
tinian economy and its future recovery. They were particularly
relevant to the development of policy-making and implementa-
tion at the Palestinian level. The Palestinian economy exper-
ienced a decline in employment, trade, and investment, and an
increase in transactional and transportation costs. 44 The GDP
declined by 6% in the year 2000, despite growth in the first three
quarters of that year. It declined by an additional 12% in the
year 2001, and is expected to decline by another 15% by the end
of this year. 4 5 The Gross National Index ("GNI") declined by
15% in 2001.146
However, the adverse economic situation does not negate
the potential for setting the Palestinian economy on the path of
sustained recovery and future growth. It is granted that political
and social stability must be attained, but short-medium term
steps to recovery require the PA to:
143. The Palestinian labor force working in Israel, which accounted for a quarter
of the total Palestinian work force, specialized in low-productivity construction and agri-
culture sectorjobs. See Basim Makhool, Economic growth and employment in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, 27 ARAB ECON. J. 11 (2002).
144. The continuation of these measures will certainly aggravate the already preca-
rious humanitarian crisis, since the economy's coping strategies have been effectively
overwhelmed by poverty. This will render attempts to address development needs par-
ticularly difficult, while emergency humanitarian needs will still be evident, even after
the attainment of stability. The experiences of other war-torn economies also show that
food aid can result in the suppression of food prices and, henceforth, act as a disincen-
tive for local farmers. At the same time, aid may increase the profitability of non-pro-
ductive activities, such as commerce and construction. These are easier arenas for the
private sector expansion than are export activities. Hence, the risk lies in the breeding
of aid dependency as a coping mechanism at the household level, as well as in the
further aggravation of the economy's structural weaknesses.
145. DEssUs, supra n.13, at 6-7.
146. Interim Agreement, supra n.4, art. XXXI(5).
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* prepare an economic and policy strategy to halt the decline
in output and income;
" restore confidence and growth;
* restore open access to foreign markets;
• focus on improving education;
* build a human resource base with solid technological skills;
" improve technology based-production;
* make the Gaza airport and seaport operational;
* establish warehouses at Palestinian ports; and
* create procedures to implement the recently signed prefer-
ential or free trade agreements with regional or international
partners.
In the long-term, the PA, following recovery and reconstruc-
tion, needs to make the Palestinian economy viable. Thus, fu-
ture policies must focus on turning the Palestinian economy into
an export market.
III. PALESTINIAN REFORM
The PA faces challenges on the political and economic
levels and also, increasingly, on the security and credibility levels.
In the meantime, in its march toward Statehood, it has been
working to deepen the principles of democracy, separation of
powers, the rule of law, and free market. However, domestic and
international pressures for achieving reform have been mount-
ing.
A. Challenges Facing Palestinian Reform
With the highly pronounced pressure for reform ever since
the establishment of the PA in 1994, it is difficult not to acknowl-
edge the notable achievements of the PA in building its adminis-
trative and institutional capacities, and in introducing regulatory
reforms. The PA made certain leaps forward, which lent it credi-
bility and provided grounds for confidence in its readiness and
potential to assume national government functions. Prior to the
current political crisis, the PA showed a commitment to strength-
ening and improving the performance of public institutions. In
1999, the PA established an Inter-Ministerial Committee to de-
velop public institutions and in 2000, it introduced a range of
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improvements in public finance management.'4 7 Its goals, by
the year 2000, were the consolidation of all public revenues
under one account; the modernization of tax collection and cus-
toms procedures to adhere to international standards; and the
divesting of the PA assets held in private enterprises, estimated at
US$345 million.' 48 These efforts were supported by measures to
set the stage for a private sector-led development, including in-
volvement of the private sector in policy-making, and a reform of
the legal framework. 4 '
The PA built institutions and capacity against a legacy of in-
stitutions and administrative practices that it inherited from the
Israeli Civil Administration. 50 It faced a dilapidated public ser-
vice infrastructure, and collapsed judiciary and legal systems.' 5'
It also had to cope with a severed West Bank and Gaza, border
closures, and a denial of free access to markets. All of this had
an adverse effect on the PA's institutional capacity. The Israeli-
imposed restrictions on movement resulted in the creation of a
redundant structure of PA institutions and established a "quasi"
PA in Gaza and the West Bank, thus increasing the burden on
the PA budget and creating inefficiencies. 5 2
Between its achievements and inheritance, the PA's per-
formance record shows that there remains room for improve-
ment, 153 especially since recent political developments strained
147. Paris Protocol, supra n.3, art. VIII.
148. President Arafat issued a decree to consolidate PA commercial investment.
The mechanism was established in August 2002. The Palestine Investment Fund
("PIF") was established. The PIF has a board of private and public sector members who
oversee the commercial investments of the PA. It conducts itself with transparency and
accountability. The process of consolidation of accounts, contracts, and investments
domestically, regionally, and internationally is subject to board oversight and planning.
149. In 1999, the PA launched the "National Economic Dialogue" on such issues as
the identification of the development interests of the private sector, and the recogni-
tion of the policies needed to enhance the role of the private sector in economic devel-
opment. The PA also developed a strategic framework for guiding legal reform, enti-
tled "Rule of Law Strategic Development Plan." By mid-2000, the PA enforced forty
laws with direct bearing on the economic or business spheres. See UNESCO, RULE OF
LAw DEVELOPMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP: SURVEY AND STATE OF TI-IE DEVEL-
OPMENT EFFORT (Gaza, 1999).
150. See Annex I1, supra n.69, Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs.
151. COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra n.86.
152. Ministries and official agencies have parallel structures and staff in the West
Bank and Gaza because staff cannot move between territorial jurisdictions. Ministers
and heads of agencies have to obtain permission from the Israeli side to travel between
their offices.
153. See UNCTAD, The Palestinian economy: achievements of the interim period and
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and challenged PA's capacity to govern, and exposed its major
weaknesses. At the economic and social planning levels, the PA
has yet to elaborate on a clear development vision and strategy
- other than a general commitment to trade and financial liber-
alization - as well as the creation of enabling environments for
the private sector and for export-led development. With the ca-
pacity to go further than headlines and a drive to verbalize in the
public and the private sectors an in-depth, systematic develop-
ment plan rooted in actual needs and interests, the PA can go
far. Yet, some of the policies reflected in legal and regulatory
arrangements are development policies that are not operational.
Their objectives are stated in generic terms and are not well con-
nected with particular programs, projects, or short-range policy
measures.
At the implementation level, the impact of the development
programs is undermined by differential competence levels
within and among ministries; weak executive capacity in translat-
ing priorities and goals into coherent action; and weaknesses in
the budgetary process, especially with regard to the consolida-
tion of fiscal accounts. All of the above problems cause fiscal
leakage and delays in service delivery. Over and above these
challenges, the size of the public sector is estimated to have
reached 115,000' employees by the year 2000.
The highly charged external and internal, political and eco-
nomic contexts affect the performance of the PA and the effi-
ciency of its institutions. The Palestinian public opinion, the
civil society, and the PLC have articulated the need for self-as-
sessment and institutional reform. 11 5 They stressed the need to
examine PA's track record on governance, accountability, trans-
parency, responsiveness, and efficiency of public services. There
is strong pressure to achieve the following:
0 establish a more efficient justice system;
tasks, for thefuture, UNCTAD/GDS/APPU/I (Jan. 19, 2001); see also WORLD BANK, WEST
BANK AND GAZA: STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT (West Bank and Gaza
Resident Mission, 1999).
154. This number of employees is equivalent to around 20% of the labor force,
with a wage bill representing almost 15% of the PA's GDP. The annual population
growth rate of 5.1% will generate a continually high demand for public services in the
future. This has to be factored into the planning of civil service restructuring of the PA.
For the moment, this is manifested in a freeze in PA employees and a 4% cut in the
nominal wage bill.
155. Id.
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* improve performance of ministries;
* reassess public sector employment policies concerning
inflated numbers of civil servants and their qualifications
and merits;
* create a more democratic decision-making process;
* set mechanisms for effective participation in the policy-
making process; and
* uproot corrupt practices.
B. Reform Agenda
Wide domestic and international consensus has established
the need for reform in the PA.'56 The call for reform comes at a
time when the PA falls short on various levels: rule of law and
regulatory framework, political accountability, and efficient pub-
lic administration and functions. The Palestinian courts and ju-
diciary rank the lowest among PA services. Security Court had
weakened the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary,
as Palestinians often resolve disputes through appeals to security
personnel instead of the Civil Court. The executive, legislative,
and judicial powers of the PA must be separated. The PA needs
to promote a strong financial system; reduce anti-competitive
practices; increase the accountability of the public sector; im-
prove PA revenue administration; and raise the efficiency of the
public sector by allowing the private sector to compete in service
delivery.' 57 The lack of a well-developed capacity, a well-trained
civil service base, and a well-planned organizational structure of
the PA institutions, detract from the PA's capacity to carry out
the functions of development. 158
156. See generally 'World Bank Group, West Bank and Gaza Office, West Bank and
Gaza Update (2002).
157. See Palestinian Legislative Council, Statement Towards Development and Re-
form of the PNA Institutions (May 16, 2002), available at http://www.pal-plc.org [here-
inafter Statement].
158. Certain key social and economic indicators did show an upward trend. Most
notable were the 76% increase in the GDP since the inception of the PA, in spite of
continued volatility; improvement in per capita GDP from US$1,274 in 1994 to
US$1,652 in 1999; reduction in the poverty rate from 27% in 1996 to 23% in 1998;
continued increase in net enrollment ratio in primary and secondary education; and
significant improvement in health, public utility, and other human and social develop-
ment indicators.
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1. PLC Reform of the PA Statement
Against this background, during a regular session on May
15-16, the PLC issued a groundbreaking statement entitled
"Statement Towards Development and Reform of the PNA Insti-
tutions" ("Statement"). 159 The Statement followed a seminal
speech delivered by President Yasir Arafat. The speech included
a frank and strong call for administrative and financial reform.
In turn, the PLC conducted a comprehensive assessment of the
PA's past performance. Since the inception of the PA in 1994,
no self-assessment of the kind had been conducted and the need
for one had now become urgent. The PLC's Statement affirmed
the President's speech and articulated the fundamental princi-
ples required for reform, especially in the areas of expenditure
measures, planning, aid coordination for the "current" emer-
gency, and policy, institutional, and structural measures. The
detailed PLC agenda included:
• enactment of the Basic Law and the Law on the Inde-
pendence of the Judiciary;
* establishment of a Constitutional Court;
* abolition of the Security Court;"'
* institution of regular general elections (legislative, local
government, and presidential);
" institution of safeguards of public freedoms;
* restructuring of the offices of the executive branch and
the Cabinet;
* assurance of transparency on public expenditures and
financials of the PA;
* restructuring of the security forces and the Public Ac-
countant's Office;
* restructuring of local government and municipalities;
* improvement of performance of the civil service and re-
duction in the number of civil servants;
* improvement of performance of the judicial and court
systems;
159. See Statement, supra n.157.
160. President Arafat issued an order on December 27, 2002, abolishing the Secur-
ity Court and merging functions in the criminal court system. This was a very signifi-
cant step because it eliminated the lack of transparency and accountability associated
with the Security Court procedures.
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" maintenance of the separation of powers and the inde-
pendence of the judiciary; and
* creation of the High Judicial Council.161
This Statement gained major momentum and provided the
impetus for the adoption of the 100 Day Plan of the Palestinian
government less than a month later.1 62 The Statement was
hailed as "forward looking" and recognised as a much-needed
policy agenda to invigorate public and private sectors. It was
deemed a renewal of hope.
2. 100 Day Plan
As the PLC and the President's Office committed them-
selves to reform, President Arafat appointed a Ministerial Re-
form Committee to produce the national agenda for reform.
On June 23, 2002, the PA issued the 100 Day Plan. The Plan
describes how the PA intends to become "more efficient and ef-
fective in the service of the national good."' 6 3 The Preamble of
the 100 Day Plan states: "[T]he Government has thus sought to
meet the requirements and demands posed by the current situa-
tion, well recognized by all zealous citizens, PLC members and
officials, for whom the national good is paramount." 164
The 100 Day Plan sets out the following agenda: a. General
Domain; b. Public Security Domain; c. Fiscal Domain; d. Judicial
Domain; and e. Other Domains. The details of these domains
are outlined below.
a. General Domain
In this domain, the focus is on the separation of powers
among the three branches. The 100 Day Plan calls for:
* promotion of the rule of law;
" restructuring of ministries and official agencies;
• creation of modern and effective civil service;
* maintenance of efficient and effective institutions to bet-
ter serve citizens of the PA;
* institution of municipal, legislative, and presidential
elections;
161. See Statement, supra n.157.
162. See Palestine News Agency, 100 Day Plan, available at www.wafa.pna.net.
163. Id.
164. Id. Preamble.
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" implementation of enacted legislation;
* an attempt at creation of alternative employment oppor-
tunities, especially for the increasing pool of workers
who can no longer access Israeli markets;
* reconstruction of the infrastructure that was destroyed
during the latest Israeli military incursions into the West
Bank and Gaza; and
* assistance to families of the wounded, imprisoned, and
the martyrs who lost their lives in the incursions. 165
b. Public Security Domain
In the public security domain, the 100 Day Plan calls for the
following:
ing:
* restructuring of the Ministry of Interior;
* consolidation of the various police and security arms of
the PA under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior;
* activation of the role of the Ministry of Interior in law
enforcement;
* re-establishment of law and public order;
* assurance that the various members of the various secur-
ity services are disciplined in and respect the rule of law;
* reinforcement of national loyalty among security forces;
and
" awareness-building among the public regarding its
rights. 166
c. Fiscal Domain
In the fiscal domain, the 100 Day Plan outlines the follow-
* reform of the operations of the Ministry of Finance and
re-establishment of the credibility of the PA internally
and externally;
* establishment and consolidation of all PA accounts into
a single treasury account from all sources (fees; foreign
aid and loans; investment activities; profits from com-
mercial operations; and taxes) and the creation of an ef-
fective system of management of this public account;
* reorganization of the commercial and investment opera-
165. Id.
166. Id.
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tions of the PA and the creation of the Palestinian Invest-
ment Fund to consolidate and manage these operations.
In this way, the Fund may be subject to stringent audit-
ing and disclosure standards;
" limitation of the expansion of public employment;
* unification of the administration of public payroll along
with the placement of this administration under the su-
pervision of the Ministry of Finance;
* completion of the creation of the modern pension sys-
tem;
* activation and development of an internal public audit
system along with appointment of financial auditors and
external auditors;
* enhancement of the independence of the office of the
General Auditor, including via a system of periodic re-
porting to the President and the PLC;
" development of an enhanced process for preparing the
general budget;
" creation of clear lines for the different budget items;
" preparation of monthly expenditure budgets for the rest
of the year 2002;
* commencement of preparation of the 2003 budget, so as
to complete it in a timely manner; and
" reconciliation of the budgets of the local and national
governments. 16
d. Judicial Domain
In the judicial domain, the 100 Day Plan articulates the fol-
lowing:
" assurance that the role of the judiciary is properly and
independently carried out;
* appointment of an adequate number of judges;
" erection of the required physical structures for court-
houses, administrative, and district attorney offices in
different districts;
* construction of modern prisons;
* implementation of the Law on the Independence of the
Judiciary;
" establishment of the Court of Cassation;
167. Id.
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* establishment of a Department for Judicial Inspections;
* overall modernization and development of the court sys-
tem; and
" creation of systems necessary to enforce and implement
the Basic Law, including a mechanism for resolving dis-
putes to which the PA is party."' 8
e. Other Domains
A number of policies and programs are enunciated under
this final domain of the 100 Day Plan. These include:
" efforts to reinforce national values, which stress that the
Palestine holds the Holy Land in trust for the entire
world;
* renunciation of all forms of fanaticism in education and
elsewhere;
* spread of the spirit of democracy, enlightenment, and
liberalism;
" activation of the role of the Ministry of Awqaf (Religious
Affairs) in creating national cohesion that serves na-
tional interests;
" resolution of chronic financial problems of universities,
schools, and hospitals;
* assurance that the processes of operation of official
agencies and ministries with similar powers are stream-
lined to increase efficiency and public administration;
* institution of an end to the interference of the security
forces in civil life and assurance that these forces con-
duct themselves within bounds of law;
* unification of all official institutions that provide services
to the investor community in an effort to streamline the
delivery of such services in an efficient manner;
" provision of training to the PA human resource base and
reinforcement of a proper work ethic;
* coordination of the delivery of foreign affairs services
with the Political Department of the PLO to increase the
effectiveness of the diplomatic corps and to introduce
the necessary changes;
* assessment of the structures of the various official agen-
cies' boards and institution of necessary changes, includ-
168. Id.
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ing the appointment of a Governor to Palestinian Mone-
tary Authority to replace the President of the PA;
" payment of close attention to issues related to environ-
mental pollution; and
* institution of safeguards against Israeli practices of trans-
porting toxic wastes for burial in the PA areas.
3. Timetable of the 100 Day Plan
The 100 Day Plan established a timetable for carrying out
the agenda enumerated above. It is well recognized that 100
days are just the beginning. Some of the tasks outlined in the
Plan will take years to complete. Where immediate steps were
possible, the PA took them - namely, in the promulgation of
the Basic Law169 and the Law on the Independence of theJudici-
ary.17" The PA has already embarked on a financial and adminis-
trative restructuring of public institutions that goes beyond
downsizing of the civil service. In addition to the Economic Pol-
icy Framework of 2000, and the recent measures referred to
above, in June 2002, the new PA Cabinet presented an inte-
grated program for government action. This program suggested
appropriate reform measures, including the process of stream-
lining the civil service payroll and new guidelines for moderniz-
ing ministries. The PA made significant changes at the ministe-
rial level in June, and again, in October 2002. These changes
entailed a merger of the Ministry of Economy and Trade with
the Ministry of Industry, and the appointment of new Ministers
of Education, Finance, Justice, Labor, Natural Resources, Inte-
rior, and Tourism. The recent adoption of the Basic Law and
the Law on the Independence of the Judiciary, as well as the
planned finalization of other laws - such as the Capital Markets
Authority Law, Competition Law, and Companies Law - will
help to improve the regulatory environment. In addition, the
PA is currently working on a comprehensive privatization plan.
Certain other steps that are contingent on Israeli coopera-
tion, such as the holding of elections scheduled for January 16,
2003, were postponed as a result of the continued closure policy,
which paralyzes movement essential for casting votes. Other
169. Basic Law (May 29, 2002).
170. Law on the Independence of the Judiciary (May 14, 2002) (author's trans.)
(on file with author).
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steps require capital investment, which the PA does not have be-
cause of its deteriorated economy. Considering the magnitude
of the challenges ahead, the key to enabling the PA to promote
sustained recovery is restoration of its capacity to manage the
economy in all its facets, and to maintain basic social and public
services. Needless to say, the ability of PA institutions to operate
without Israeli intervention in areas under the PAjurisdiction, is
a prerequisite for mounting any sustained development effort.
C. International Task Force on Palestinian Reform
To solidify and assist the PA in implementing the 100 Day
Plan and its overall reform agenda, the international donor com-
munity established the International Task Force on Palestinian
Reform ("Task Force"). The Task Force is comprised of the so-
called "Quartet" (the EU, Russia, the U.N., and the United
States), and Japan, Norway, the IMF, and the World Bank. 7 ' To
date, the Task Force has met four times: in London on July 10;
in Paris on August 22 and 23; in Amman on November 15 and
16; and in Washington, D.C. on December 19 and 20.
The Task Force divides the reform agenda into seven Re-
form Support Groups. They are comprised of: 1. Civil Society; 2.
Elections; 3. Financial Accountability; 4. Judiciary/Rule of Law;
5. Local Government; 6. Market Economy; and 7. Ministerial and
Civil Service Reform. The role of these Groups is to monitor
progress, assess obstacles, prepare key actions, establish
benchmarks, and provide technical assistance to the PA to en-
sure that the reform is carried out in a timely and sustainable
manner. In some areas, the reform is realized and has
progressed better than in other areas. 172 The Task Force focuses
on the areas where the Israeli and the Palestinian actions are
required in order to facilitate the process of reform. It receives
reports from the seven Reform Support Groups. Since its incep-
tion on July 10, 2002, the Task Force has worked with the PA to
develop the details of the 100 Day Reform Program. The core of
the PA reform lies in the building of a foundation of Palestinian
Statehood and a rebuilding of trust, which jointly pave the way
for the resumption of political negotiations.
171. West Bank and Gaza Update, supra n.156.
172. Reports on progress are limited and are not available in the public domain.
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D. Basic Law, Law on the Independence of the Judiciary, and
Vote of No Confidence
Among the main highlights of the Reform Program was the
promulgation of the Basic Law and the Law on the Indepen-
dence of the Judiciary. Also crucial was the exercise of the vote
of no confidence by the PLC. The significance of these three
steps lies in the introduction of the concept of separation of
powers among the three branches of government; the establish-
ment of the independence of the judicial branch; and the first
exercise by the PLC of its right to object on issues related to the
formation of the presidential proposal for the Cabinet.
1. Basic Law
The PA is empowered by the PLO, acting on behalf of the
Palestinian people within and without the West Bank and Gaza,
and by the authorities transferred to it under the DOP, the Paris
Protocol, and the Interim Agreement. 173 As demonstrated
above, these authorities are limited and inconsistent, and have
precluded the PA from exercising full powers in creating a dem-
ocratic regime with institutions that are accountable and effi-
cient. The promulgation of the Basic Law on May 29, 2002174
gave the PA a "constitutional" basis for its powers. The Basic Law
underwent a series of drafts over a period of years. The work
started in 1993 by the PLO's Executive Committee.1 75 The
changes in the geopolitical conditions, the Oslo process, the first
Palestinian elections in 1996, and the formation of the PLC, im-
pacted the shape of the present Basic Law and its operations."'
Thus, the entry into force of the Basic Law was a turning
point for the PA on an internal level. The Basic Law provides for
a parliamentary democracy 177 based on the rule of law, 178 and
for separation of powers.1 79 It calls for a free market as the basis
of the Palestinian economy. 8 ° It calls for freedom of speech,18 '
173. Annex III, supra n.69, app. I.
174. See Basic Law, supra n.169.
175. See GREGORY S. MAHLER, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE PALESTINIAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT 127-30 (PASSIA, Jerusalem, 1996) (on file with author).
176. Id.
177. Basic Law, supra n.169, art. 5.
178. Id. art. 6.
179. Id. art. 2.
180. Id. art. 21.
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guaranteed personal freedom,"'8 and freedom of religion. 83 It
upholds the independence of the judiciary.1 4 It calls for the es-
tablishment of a Constitutional Court 8 ' and provides for judi-
cial review.' The Basic Law grants the function of judicial re-
view to the Supreme Court.' Moreover, the Basic Law grants
the PLC the power to hold the Executive accountable for his
actions and vice versa.188 In other words, a system of checks and
balances is created. The Basic Law empowers the PLC to launch
an investigation into conduct of members of the executive
branch. 89
However, the Basic Law is an interim law and leaves many
gaps and ambiguities. Most of these hinge on the scope of sover-
eign powers and the need for a clearer separation of powers.
Under the Basic Law, the President of the PA and the Cabinet
maintain expansive control over the legislative process. 9 " Addi-
tionally, the President has veto power over legislation.' Moreo-
ver, the President and the Cabinet are not accountable to the
PLC as far as their policy-making activities, which include policy
formulation, implementation, and assessment. 92 In these re-
spects, the Basic Law marginalizes the legislature and the judici-
ary.
The promulgation of the Basic Law constitutes a step for-
ward at the internal Palestinian level. Yet, the Basic Law remains
an interim law so long as the PA is an interim government. The
Basic Law does not rise to a full constitutional law, nor does it
allocate sovereign powers fully. In the meantime, the PA has es-
tablished a Constitutional Law Committee charged with drafting
the Palestinian Constitution. It is a work in progress.
181. Id. art. 19.
182. Id. art. 10(1).
183. Id. art. 18.
184. Id. art. 88.
185. Id. art. 94(1).
186. Id. arts. 94(1) (a) and (b).
187. Id. art. 95.
188. Id. arts. 68 and 69.
189. Id. art. 45.
190. Id. art. 57(1).
191. Id.
192 Id. arts. 72-74.
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2. Palestinian Judiciary and the Law on the Independence of
the Judiciary
After seven years of Palestinian self-rule, the Palestinian ju-
diciary has not succeeded in formulating the required stepping-
stones needed to establish a strong notion of the rule of law in
the PA. The principle is often discussed, and the PA organs call
for it. The Basic Law expressly provides for it. Upon close exam-
ination, certain historical reasons come to the fore. These rea-
sons are embedded in historical fact and the legacies of Otto-
man, British, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli occupations. 19 3
Other reasons include the different legal heritage of the West
Bank and Gaza.194 The most salient factor, however, inheres in
the structure of the PA, since separation of powers was not
achieved when the PA was first created. At that time, the execu-
tive branch, its Cabinet, ministries and agencies were estab-
lished. In addition, the PLC was elected and its various commit-
tees set up.
By contrast, the Palestinian judiciary has a depilated legacy
of inconsistent legislation, dysfunctional organs, and a human
resource base of limited skills. As such, the judiciary has been
unable to regroup or to rehabilitate. A movement for establish-
ing an independent and functional judiciary began only during
the present reform period. The same is true of the revamping of
standards of the legal profession and membership in the Bar.
Thus, the significance in the promulgation of the Law on the
Independence of the Judiciary, which came into force on May
14, 2002,19 5 was tremendous. This step was important because it
confirmed the separation of powers issue articulated in the Basic
Law and established an independentjudiciary. This Law created
the High Independent Judicial Council and empowered the ju-
diciary to maintain its independence from interferences by the
Executive, be it the Ministry of Justice,'9 6 the security appara-
tuses, or the President's Office. For years, court decisions had
been subject to such influences and the independence of judges
had been tarred.
193. See generally RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIERS LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK
(1988). See also Wagner supra n.86.
194. Wagner, supra n.86.
195. See Law on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra n.170.
196. Prior to the enactment of this Law, the Minister ofJustice had oversight over
the judiciary.
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The Law on the Independence of the Judiciary specifies the
types of courts and the scope of their jurisdictions. There are
religious courts for personal status matters; a Constitutional
Court; a Supreme Court; and three levels of lower courts that
have varied personal and subject matter jurisdiction.197 The ap-
pointment and promotion of judges is independent. The High
Judicial Council recommends, and the President confirms, nom-
inees. "'98 Judges cannot be removed except for cause, as speci-
fied in the Law.' 99 The High Judicial Council is in charge of
their promotion. 9"' The critical aspect of the Law is the creation
of an independent judicial organ, charged with the administra-
tive oversight and training of judges.20 ' This is a major depar-
ture from the vacuum that existed prior to the promulgation of
this Law and a shift away from the concentration of powers in
the hands of the Executive. The President is no longer in
charge of the judiciary. He only has so-called "confirmation
power." Furthermore, the newly promulgated Basic Law and the
Law on the Independence of the Judiciary will help to clear the
blurred power distinctions among the Minister of Justice, the
Chief Justice, and the Attorney General. For years, the Minister
of Justice and the Chief Justice believed that they held the same
responsibilities relevant to appointment of judges, maintenance
of the composition of the Judicial Council, and a number of
other administrative judicial issues. 2 0 2
3. Vote of No Confidence
As the Reform Program took root, democratic practices
were being tested. The first exercise was the potential vote of no
confidence by the PLC in the existing Cabinet.20° The composi-
tion of this Cabinet came under increasing challenge by the
197. Law on the Independence of the judiciary, supra n.170, arts. 6 and 14.
198. Id. art. 18.
199. Id. art. 27.
200. Id. arts. 6 and 14.
201. Id. arts. 37-43.
202. The problem is two-fold. First, Gaza and the West Bank follow different legal
traditions (Anglo-Saxon in Gaza and Continental in the West Bank). Thus, the source
of authority, as derived from existing laws, empowers the Minister of Justice and Chief
Justice differently. The second, is the separation of powers issue. The problems are
gradually being addressed, especially after the promulgation of the Basic Law and the
Law on the Independence of the Judiciary.
203. See PLC Minutes of the September and October Sessions, 2002 (author's
trans.) (on file with author). See also Basic Law, supra n.169, art. 44.
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PLC. Pressure mounted on the President to reshuffle his Cabi-
net on the grounds of incompetence, corruption, and general
lack of confidence in its ability to perform its duties. Members
of the Cabinet were quick to submit letters of resignation to
avoid the vote of no confidence.
In reaction, the President of the PA proposed a new compo-
sition for his Cabinet on September 11, 2002. The PLC debated
and the vote of no confidence was about to be cast when the
Cabinet resigned. The threat was averted, but the message was
clear. The President reshuffled a second time and submitted a
different composition. After much debate, the PLC gave its vote
of confidence on October 29, 2002. The vote included fifty-six
in favour and eighteen opposed. °4
The significance of the vote of no confidence lies in the
clear departure from the restrictions imposed by the executive
branch on the legislature. This step has set the precedent for
change in the relationship between these two branches, and cre-
ated a new order of checks and balances, long sought and called
for by the PLC. This step will lead to greater protection and
enforcement of civil and political rights.
CONCLUSIONS
When Israel is asked to explain its military actions against
Palestinian civilians, it always responds by stating that it has 'little
choice but to defend itself. When Palestinians are asked why
they persist in confronting Israeli soldiers, the answer is that they
are fighting to end Israeli occupation.
Central to the peace process between the Israelis and the
Palestinians is the end of occupation. The Israelis and the Pales-
tinians recognize that fact. The initial series of Agreements
signed by the two sides, namely the DOP, the Paris Protocol, and
the Interim Agreement, were designed to result in an end to oc-
cupation and economic development, pending permanent
peace. The Agreements had a time frame of five years. When
the time for their implementation lapsed, Palestinians started to
lose hope and frustration escalated.
From 1995 until the Camp David Accords in 2000, a series
of side agreements were signed. These agreements include the
Agreement on Hebron of January 1996, the Wye River Memo-
204. See PLC Minutes, supra n.203.
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randum of October 1998, and the Sharam al Sheikh Agreement
of September 1999. This second series of agreements also failed
to bring about concrete results for implementing the existing
Agreements. In July 2000, the U.S.-brokered final status discus-
sions at Camp David broke down; in January 2001, Taba negotia-
tions were held; in April 2001, the Mitchell Report was pub-
lished. 2"5 Nevertheless the conflict escalated. In June 2002,
President George W. Bush articulated a two-State solution by
2005;26 and in November 2002, the U.S. Road Map was pro-
posed. These numerous agreements, meetings, discussions,
speeches, and negotiations have not yielded the desired peace
for both sides. Transitional arrangements outside the scope of a
concrete, final status framework, have proved ineffective.
The Palestinians have to free themselves from occupation to
create free and democratic institutions. The Reform Program
and its initial results are steps in the right direction. It is a recog-
nized fact that the political-economic order established from
1994 to 2000 contributed to undermining the stability of the
PA's rule. The PA could not, due to internal and external fac-
tors, induce sustainable growth. The majority of Palestinians
and their businesses found themselves marginalized and de-
prived of the benefits of the peace process. The visit of Sharon
to the al-Aqsa Mosque, the stalled Camp David, and the events of
September 2000, had major consequences for both sides. Israel
militarized the conflict, the PA ability to mitigate the unrest
came under question, and the Palestinian economy collapsed.
The PA reform efforts focused on rebuilding the PA's insti-
tutional capacity and the rule of law in order to strengthen dem-
ocratic principles, will be an important factor in finding a solu-
tion. The answer, though, lies in a negotiated settlement based
on sovereign principles and a permanent peace treaty - not in
functional, political, and economic interim arrangements. To
be sure, Israel and Palestine, as two States existing side-by-side,
will have some degree of economic interdependence. A true
peace built on mutual respect, sovereign rights, and reciprocity,
will grant their respective economies and the entire region, long
overdue recovery and sustained growth.
205. A copy of the Mitchell Report is available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/
nea/mitchell.htm.
206. See supra n.14 and accompanying text.
